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Abstract
Recent philosophical work has praised the reward structure of sci-
ence, while recent empirical work has shown that many scientific re-
sults may not be reproducible. I argue that the reward structure of
science incentivizes scientists to focus on speed and impact at the ex-
pense of the reproducibility of their work, thus contributing to the
so-called reproducibility crisis. I use a rational choice model to iden-
tify a set of sufficient conditions for this problem to arise, and I argue
that these conditions plausibly apply to a wide range of research situa-
tions. Currently proposed solutions will not fully address this problem.
Philosophical commentators should temper their optimism about the
reward structure of science.
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The reward structure of science has been of increasing interest to philoso-
phers. The literature on this subject has focused on the good news: ways in
which rewards can contribute to scientific progress.1 The present contribu-
tion nuances this message by highlighting some bad news, in particular that
the reward structure gives scientists an incentive to rush into print, which
plausibly contributes to reproducibility problems.
A central aim of the philosophical literature on the reward structure seems
to be to argue against the view that scientific progress is best served when
individual scientists are epistemically rational. A paradigm case is the ar-
gument by Kitcher and Strevens that reward-seeking scientists will choose
research programs or methodologies in a way that makes for a socially bene-
1A number of these papers have appeared in this journal: Philip Kitcher, “The Di-
vision of Cognitive Labor,” this journal, lxxxvii, 1 (January 1990): 5–22; Michael
Strevens, “The Role of the Priority Rule in Science,” this journal, c, 2 (February 2003):
55–79; Kevin J. S. Zollman, “The Credit Economy and the Economic Rationality of Sci-
ence,” this journal, cxv, 1 (January 2018): 5–33. Other optimistic appraisals of the
reward structure by philosophers and economists include Michael Polanyi, “The Republic
of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory,” Minerva, i, 1 (Autumn 1962): 54–73;
David L. Hull, Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Con-
ceptual Development of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); David L.
Hull, “What’s Wrong with Invisible-Hand Explanations?,” Philosophy of Science, lxiv,
Proceedings (1997): S117–26; Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science with-
out Legend, Objectivity without Illusions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Partha
Dasgupta and Paul A. David, “Toward a New Economics of Science,” Research Policy,
xxiii, 5 (September 1994): 487–521; Thomas C. Leonard, “Reflection on Rules in Sci-
ence: An Invisible-Hand Perspective,” Journal of Economic Methodology, ix, 2 (2002):
141–68; Thomas Boyer, “Is a Bird in the Hand Worth Two in the Bush? Or, Whether
Scientists Should Publish Intermediate Results,” Synthese, cxci, 1 (January 2014): 17–35;
Thomas Boyer-Kassem and Cyrille Imbert, “Scientific Collaboration: Do Two Heads Need
to Be More than Twice Better than One?,” Philosophy of Science, lxxxii, 4 (October
2015): 667–88; Peter J. Boettke and Kyle W. O’Donnell, “The Social Responsibility of
Economists,” in George F. DeMartino and Deirdre N. McCloskey, eds., The Oxford Hand-
book of Professional Economic Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 116–36;
Michael Strevens, “Scientific Sharing, Communism, and the Social Contract,” in Thomas
Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson, and Michael Weisberg, eds., Scientific Collaboration
and Collective Knowledge: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 3–33;
and Remco Heesen, “Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science,” Philosophy of
Science, lxxxiv, 4 (October 2017): 698–716.
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ficial division of labor.2 Since writers on epistemic rationality focus on what
it is rational to believe rather than what it is rational to do,3 it is not obvious
what, if anything, would be the epistemically rational choice of methodol-
ogy.4 Kitcher assumes that epistemically rational scientists choose whichever
methodology they think has the greatest chance of success and argues that
the distribution of scientists over methodologies this produces can potentially
be improved by an appropriate reward structure, while Strevens focuses only
on showing that reward-seeking scientists can achieve an optimal distribu-
tion.
Kitcher, Strevens, and the other authors listed in footnote 1 all use the
apparatus of decision and game theory to investigate how rational scientists
might respond to various reward structures. Further, they each praise a
particular reward structure as incentivizing individual behavior that is good
for scientific progress. In doing so these authors take an optimistic stance on
the reward structure. They acknowledge that scientists may be motivated
by a desire for personal reward (that is, credit or prestige) but then go on
to suggest that, somewhat surprisingly, this leads to better outcomes than
a hypothetical scientific enterprise populated by high-minded scientists who
are indifferent to credit. The reward structure ends up looking much like
Adam Smith’s invisible hand, guiding self-interested individual scientists to
2Kitcher, “Division of Cognitive Labor,” op. cit.; and Strevens, “Role of the Priority
Rule,” op. cit. Related work on scientists’ choice of research program or methodology
with less of a focus on rewards includes Michael Weisberg and Ryan Muldoon, “Epistemic
Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor,” Philosophy of Science, lxxvi, 2 (April
2009): 225–52; Kevin J. S. Zollman, “The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity,”
Erkenntnis, lxxii, 1 (January 2010): 17–35; Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin J. S. Zollman,
and David Danks, “The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology
Diverge,” Philosophy of Science, lxxviii, 4 (October 2011): 653–77; and Johanna Thoma,
“The Epistemic Division of Labor Revisited,” Philosophy of Science, lxxxii, 3 (July 2015):
454–72.
3See, for example, Thomas Kelly, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality:
A Critique,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, lxvi, 3 (May 2003): 612–40;
and Richard Pettigrew, Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016).
4Zollman, “Credit Economy,” op. cit., argues that this is an important omission.
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socially beneficial choices.5
I agree with much of the broader message in this work. There are in-
teresting normative questions to be asked about science that go beyond the
traditional ones about rational belief and evidence, and thinking about the
reward structure of science is a fruitful source of such questions and potential
answers. My aim in this contribution is not to challenge these virtues but
rather to temper some of the optimism mentioned above.
The reward structure of science does not always act like an invisible hand.
In some situations there is a systematic misalignment between what rational
credit-maximizing scientists would do and what would be best for them to
do from a social perspective. I illustrate this by studying the question of how
much research a scientist should do before publishing her work. I argue that
in many cases there will be an incentive to publish quickly, which plausibly
contributes to the reproducibility crisis that has recently received significant
attention.
The reproducibility of scientific research is a cornerstone of the scientific
method. If science is to discover general laws or principles, it should not
matter who tests them, or when, or where. Thus it is a necessary condition
for the acceptability of a particular scientific result that, if some (hypothetical
or actual) scientist competently performs the same experiment, it produces
the same result.
Especially in medicine and psychology, there has long been “a general im-
pression that many results that are published are hard to reproduce,”6 which
has recently begun to be empirically tested. Two studies by pharmaceutical
companies could reproduce less than a quarter of results in cancer biology.7
5For explicit comparisons of the reward structure of science to an invisible hand, see
in particular Hull, Science as a Process, op. cit.; Hull, “Invisible-Hand Explanations,” op.
cit.; Leonard, “Rules in Science,” op. cit.; and Polanyi, “Republic of Science,” op. cit.
6Florian Prinz, Thomas Schlange, and Khusru Asadullah, “Believe It or Not: How
Much Can We Rely on Published Data on Potential Drug Targets?,” Nature Reviews
Drug Discovery, x, 9 (2011): 712.
7Ibid.; and C. Glenn Begley and Lee M. Ellis, “Raise Standards for Preclinical Cancer
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A large, more systematic study of prominent results in psychology found that
less than 40% could be reproduced, while similar studies of social science ex-
periments and experimental philosophy successfully reproduced about 60%
and about 70%, respectively.8
Low empirical reproducibility rates do not prove by themselves that there
is a problem (they could simply be an indication that there are few true
discoveries to be made), but my claim is that there is in fact a problem, and
it stems from the reward structure of science.
Claim (Rushing into print). Scientists are incentivized to produce more
results at the expense of spending more time on the reproducibility of any
given result.
The aim of the rational choice model I present below is to establish condi-
tions for this claim to hold. I argue that three basic ingredients are sufficient:
first, the fact that speed and reproducibility trade off against each other; sec-
ond, the fact that scientists get rewarded for publications; and third, the fact
that publications depend on peer review, which has to assess the medium-
to long-term impact of papers in the short term, and necessarily does so
imperfectly.
My analysis differs from those that identify particular journal practices9 or
Research,” Nature, cccclxxxiii, 7391 (Mar. 29, 2012): 531–33. A more systematic study
is currently underway; see Brian A. Nosek and Timothy M. Errington, “Reproducibility
in Cancer Biology: Making Sense of Replications,” eLife, vi (2017): e23383.
8Open Science Collaboration, “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Sci-
ence,” Science, cccxlix, 6251 (Aug. 28, 2015): aac4716; Colin F. Camerer et al., “Eval-
uating the Replicability of Social Science Experiments in Nature and Science between
2010 and 2015,” Nature Human Behaviour, ii, 9 (2018): 637–44; and Florian Cova et al.,
“Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy,” Review of Philosophy and
Psychology (forthcoming), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0400-9.
9Such as “publication bias,” a preference for positive or statistically significant results.
See P. J. Easterbrook, R. Gopalan, J. A. Berlin, and D. R. Matthews, “Publication Bias in
Clinical Research,” The Lancet, cccxxxvii, 8746 (Apr. 3, 1991): 867–72; and Matthias
Egger and George Davey Smith, “Bias in Location and Selection of Studies,” BMJ, cccxvi,
7124 (1998): 61–66.
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statistical practices10 as the only sources of reproducibility problems. I do not
deny that these practices exist and contribute to reproducibility problems, or
that it would be a good idea to implement the remedies they suggest (such as
publishing null results and requiring pre-analysis plans). However, my model
does not incorporate these problematic practices and hence shows that the
proposed remedies do not suffice to eliminate reproducibility problems. In
this sense my analysis is more general, implying that the problem is harder
to solve than might otherwise be thought.
I discuss possible remedies in the final section of this paper. I argue
that no “nearby” reward structure fully solves this problem. This is the
sense in which I temper the optimism of the philosophical literature on the
reward structure: whereas for a number of issues, including the choice of
methodology, there are (under certain assumptions) reward structures that
incentivize socially optimal choices, I argue that the analogous claim for the
tradeoff between speed and reproducibility fails to hold.
i. a tradeoff between speed and reproducibility
Consider a scientist working on a research study. When should she attempt
to publish her work? Because I am interested in what the scientist has a
credit incentive to do, I assume that credit is her only concern in making this
decision. This is a methodological assumption to isolate the credit incentive.
Since the scientist aims to maximize the amount of credit she accrues per
unit time, she prefers to publish quickly rather than slowly (all else being
equal): the concern for credit entails a concern for speed (to be defined more
formally below). At the same time, publishing faster reduces reproducibility.
By reproducibility I mean, loosely speaking, the likelihood that the result of
the research study is reproduced if someone attempts to do so.
10Such as data dredging. See Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson, and Uri Simonsohn,
“False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows
Presenting Anything as Significant,” Psychological Science, xxii, 11 (November 2011):
1359–66.
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This loose definition of reproducibility has two problems. First, what
if no one attempts to reproduce the result? And second, what if multiple
scientists attempt to reproduce it, with some succeeding and some failing?
Since credit is conferred socially, what really matters is the standing of a
result in the eyes of other scientists. So I call a scientific result accurate if
it holds up in the relevant scientific community in the mid-term: either no
one attempts to reproduce it, or subsequent studies are taken on balance
to reproduce the result. Conversely, I call a result erroneous if it does not
hold up in the mid-term, that is, if the community deems the result irre-
producible. The reproducibility of the result is then the scientist’s subjective
probability, given the evidence gathered at the time of publication, that the
result is accurate. This definition should be interpreted broadly, applying to
both experimental and non-experimental contributions (for example, a math-
ematical theorem is considered reproducible if no one discovers a mistake in
it).
In the model, the scientist chooses the desired reproducibility p ∈ [0, 1]
ex ante. I assume this to be fixed for the duration of the study. That
is, the scientist works on her study until she thinks her result has at least
probability p of holding up in the community, at which time she publishes.
Reproducibility takes time. This is reflected in the model by the speed
function λ. The value λ(p) represents the scientist’s expected speed if the
desired reproducibility is p, that is, the number of studies “like this one”
that the scientist would expect to complete per unit time (see Figure 1). So
µ(p) = 1/λ(p) is the (ex ante) expected time until completion of the study.
Reducing reproducibility (lowering p) allows the scientist to publish faster.
“Rushing” the work in this way could mean that the scientist ends the study
sooner (gathering less evidence), or it could mean that the scientist tries to
gather the same amount of evidence more quickly (potentially making mis-


















Figure 1: p and λ trade off against each other. In this example, λ(p) = 1−p2,
satisfying Assumptions 1–3.
to deliberate fraud, such as when data is misreported or fabricated.11
I make a number of assumptions on the way speed and reproducibility
trade off against each other, as reflected in the speed function λ.
Assumption 1 (The speed function is decreasing). For all p, q ∈ [0, 1], if
p < q, then λ(q) < λ(p).
Assuming that λ is decreasing means that the scientist expects to take
more time to do research that is less likely to be erroneous, by collecting
more data or being more thorough, say. One might object that in some
situations (such as when the scientist discovers a mistake in her previous
work) the scientist’s confidence in the reproducibility of her work might go
down instead of up over time, seemingly in violation of this assumption.
But this misinterprets the function λ. This function gives, for each desired
reproducibility p, the scientist’s ex ante expectation of how long it would
11But see Justin P. Bruner, “Policing Epistemic Communities,” Episteme, x, 4 (Decem-
ber 2013): 403–16; and Liam Kofi Bright, “On Fraud,” Philosophical Studies, clxxiv, 2
(February 2017): 291–310.
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take for her confidence in her result to reach at least level p. So if the
scientist’s confidence was at p or above before discovering the mistake, she
would already have published, but if her confidence was below p she will have
to work until it finally reaches p before publishing.
Thus the model does not capture the dynamics of a scientist’s expecta-
tions about the duration of the project as they change over time. However,
I expect that similar conclusions would be reached in a suitable dynamic
model by evaluating the scientist’s expectations at any given time.
Assumption 2 (The speed function is concave). For every p, q, t ∈ [0, 1],
(1) tλ(p) + (1− t)λ(q) ≤ λ(tp+ (1− t)q).
This assumption reflects a kind of decreasing marginal returns. As the
reproducibility p is lowered, the expected speed λ increases ever more slowly:
writing the paper itself takes time, which becomes relatively more signif-
icant if the scientist spends relatively little time on the research content.
Conversely, if the scientist aims for higher reproducibility (increasing p), the
speed λ drops off ever faster. More time is required to increase p from 0.8 to
0.9, say, than from 0.7 to 0.8.12
Assumption 3 (No perfect work). limp→1 λ(p) = 0.
This assumption asserts that the scientist cannot deliver perfect work (in
the sense of zero probability of errors), no matter how slowly she works. This
reflects the fact that there is no certainty in science: it is always possible for
any fact or discovery to be overturned, as Lakatos and Quine have argued.
Note that these assumptions imply the following restrictions on the ex-
pected completion time µ(p) = 1/λ(p): the expected completion time is
increasing and convex, and diverges to infinity as p approaches one. These
restrictions can be given justifications analogous to the above.
12This observation goes back at least to Charles Sanders Peirce, “Note on the Theory of
the Economy of Research,” Operations Research, xv, 4 (1967 [1879]): 643–48, at p. 644.
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The above assumptions also imply that the expected speed is a continuous
function of reproducibility, which may be unrealistic when (say) experimental
results arrive in batches, leading to discontinuous jumps in reproducibility.
This is only a problem for my model if such discontinuities are sufficiently
common and predictable that the scientist can anticipate them (since the
speed function reflects her ex ante expectations). This requires not only that
the scientist knows in advance that experimental results arrive in batches,
but also that she can predict fairly accurately what level of reproducibility
she will reach with the first batch.
Such cases may arise; my claim here is not to capture the choices of all
scientists everywhere, but a large range of cases. The types of cases excluded
from the model are those in which evidence is gathered in discrete amounts,
with relatively predictable effects on the scientist’s confidence in her results,
and where the scientist is in a position to decide whether or not to gather
more evidence after seeing some initial results.
ii. peer review, credit, and social value
For reasons I outlined above, I assume the scientist gets credit only for pub-
lished work. Whether the scientist’s work is published is determined through
peer review. The purpose of peer review is to determine the accuracy of the
scientist’s work.
Suppose this “pre-screening” works perfectly: all and only those papers
that are in fact accurate are accepted. The scientist does not know whether
her paper is accurate. She only knows the reproducibility p: her own credence
that it is accurate. So from the scientist’s perspective, if she produces a paper
with reproducibility p, there is a probability p that the journal publishes it.
Writing ca for the average amount of credit that accrues to the scientist for
a published accurate result, the scientist’s expected credit per unit time is a
function C of the chosen reproducibility p given by C(p) = capλ(p).
In reality the peer review system cannot perform its “pre-screening” per-
10
fectly. Some accurate results get rejected (so-called false negatives), while
some erroneous results get accepted (false positives). Following common us-
age in statistics I write α for the probability of a false positive and β for the
probability that a false negative is avoided, or equivalently, that an accurate
result is accepted.
I assume that peer review is imperfect in the sense of there being a positive
probability of false positives (α > 0). I remain agnostic on the possibility of
false negatives (β ≤ 1) although it seems reasonable to assume that those
occur as well. I do assume that accurate results, like erroneous results, have
a non-negligible chance of acceptance (β > 0).
Assumption 4 (Imperfect peer review). The peer review acceptance prob-
abilities are such that α > 0 and β > 0.
I write ce for the average amount of credit accrued for a published erro-
neous result. Research that failed to reproduce is still frequently cited as if
it were accurate,13 even after a formal retraction.14 In other cases the fact
that the proposed hypothesis has fallen out of favor does not prevent it from
being a credit-worthy contribution to science, such as with Priestley’s work
on phlogiston. This suggests that erroneous publications are worth some
credit (ce > 0), although I will not assume this: I allow that credit for er-
roneous publications may sometimes be negative. The point here is simply
that erroneous publications can influence a scientist’s credit stock.
Putting all of this together yields the following. The scientist works on
her study at expected speed λ(p). The result is accurate with probability p.
In this case it gets published with probability β and this publication is worth
ca units of credit. With probability 1 − p the result is erroneous, which
13Athina Tatsioni, Nikolaos G. Bonitsis, and John P. A. Ioannidis, “Persistence of
Contradicted Claims in the Literature,” Journal of the American Medical Association,
ccxcviii, 21 (Dec. 5, 2007): 2517–26.
14John M. Budd, MaryEllen Sievert, and Tom R. Schultz, “Phenomena of Retraction:
Reasons for Retraction and Citations to the Publications,” Journal of the American Med-
ical Association, cclxxx, 3 (Jul. 15, 1998): 296–97.
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leads to a publication worth ce units of credit with probability α. Thus the
scientist’s expected credit per unit time, as a function of p, is
(2) C(p) = caβpλ(p) + ceα(1− p)λ(p).
To compare the individually optimal (that is, credit-maximizing) tradeoff
between speed and reproducibility to the socially optimal tradeoff, it is im-
portant to be explicit about what is meant by the social value of a research
study. Here I have in mind the contribution that it makes to science as a
social enterprise, which in turn benefits society. This is reflected in the uti-
lization of the work by other scientists, and the extent to which it or work
based on it finds its way into society, in the form of a new medicine, for
example.
What is the expected social value V of the scientist’s research? I assume
that research can have social value only when it is published. The probabil-
ities of publication α and β, the reproducibility p, and the expected speed
λ(p) are all as above. Hence
(3) V (p) = vaβpλ(p) + veα(1− p)λ(p),
where va is the average social value of an accurate result, and ve the average
social value of an erroneous result. The social value function looks very
similar to the credit function, but in section iii I argue that there is reason
to expect ve to differ systematically from ce.
Assumption 5 (Positive value). Accurate results have positive credit
value (ca > 0) and social value (va > 0).
With Assumption 5 in place, the first result follows. It states that the
functions C and V have unique maxima: there is a particular reproducibil-
ity that a rational credit-maximizing scientist would choose, and there is a
particular reproducibility that maximizes the social value of the scientist’s
12
contribution.15
Theorem 1 (Unique maxima). If Assumptions 1–5 are satisfied, then
there exist unique values p∗C < 1 and p∗V < 1 that maximize the functions C
and V respectively, that is,
(4) C(p∗C) = max
p∈[0,1]
C(p) and V (p∗V ) = max
p∈[0,1]
V (p).
Note that p∗V < 1. This means that, even from the social perspective,
perfect reproducibility is not a goal worth striving for. In other words, even
if the scientist was “high-minded” in the sense that she only cared about
maximizing the social value of her scientific work, she should not strive to
avoid error at all cost.
This is a more or less direct consequence of the “no perfect work” as-
sumption and hence reflects the insight of Lakatos and Quine that there is
no certainty in science. It means that even in a science functioning perfectly,
a tradeoff between speed and reproducibility must be made, and hence er-
rors should be expected. I emphasize this point since philosophers of science
and epistemologists have said a lot about error avoidance but relatively little
about how to achieve this in a reasonable time frame.16
iii. the incentive to rush into print
Theorem 1 does not say how the credit-maximizing reproducibility p∗C and the
social-value-maximizing reproducibility p∗V relate to each other. Establishing
such a relation requires further assumptions on the parameter values.
The first assumption is that credit is awarded for (accurate) scientific
15A proof is provided in appendix A of Remco Heesen, “Expediting the Flow of Knowl-
edge Versus Rushing into Print,” PhilSci-Archive (2018), http://philsci-archive.
pitt.edu/15161/, where this result is labeled Theorem 3.1.
16See Michael Friedman, “Truth and Confirmation,” this journal, lxxvi, 7 (July 1979):
361–82; and Remco Heesen, “How Much Evidence Should One Collect?,” Philosophical
Studies, clxxii, 9 (September 2015): 2299–313.
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work proportional to its social value (va = ca). Since, for all I have said
so far, credit and social value are measured on unspecified interval scales,
this may be viewed merely as fixing these scales (without loss of generality).
Merton and Strevens argue that there is in fact a substantive link between
the credit given for scientific achievements and the social value resulting from
them.17
How about the social value of an erroneous result ve? I take it that errors
are distracting or actively misleading more often than they are instructive.
Take, for instance, a study which erroneously finds that a particular medicine
helps cure some disease. Once the erroneous finding is published, it takes
more time and effort to set the record straight than it would have in the
absence of the erroneous publication. Moreover, before the error is corrected
there may be negative consequences for other research and public health.18
So it seems to me that erroneous results are, on average, at best socially
neutral, if not socially harmful: ve ≤ 0. And I suggested above that they
may still yield positive credit: ce > 0. However, I need not insist on these
conclusions. The weaker assumption that the social value of erroneous results
is less than the credit given for them (ve < ce) suffices for my argument.
Assumption 6 (Credit and social value). Accurate results are awarded
credit proportional to their social value (ca = va), while the social value of
erroneous results is less than the credit given for them (ve < ce).
The main result of this paper can now be stated. It says that the imperfec-
tions in the peer review system and the way credit is awarded systematically
favor lower levels of reproducibility. That is, a scientist who maximizes ex-
pected credit will set reproducibility no higher than the optimal level from
17Robert K. Merton, “Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of
Science,” American Sociological Review, xxii, 6 (December 1957): 635–59, at p. 659; and
Strevens, “Role of the Priority Rule,” op. cit., p. 78.
18There may even be negative consequences after the error is corrected. See Budd,
Sievert, and Schultz, “Phenomena of Retraction,” op. cit.; and Tatsioni, Bonitsis, and
Ioannidis, “Persistence of Contradicted Claims,” op. cit.
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the perspective of maximizing social value.19
Theorem 2 (Rushing into print). Let Assumptions 1–6 be satisfied, and
define p∗C and p∗V as in Theorem 1. Then p∗C ≤ p∗V .
Given the assumptions, there is a credit incentive to produce research at
a systematically lower reproducibility than is socially optimal. This result
depends crucially on the imperfections in the peer review system, and in
particular the possibility of false positives: if α = 0 and β > 0 then Assump-
tions 1–3 and 5 are sufficient to show that the functions C and V have unique
maxima, and that these maxima are equal. Given imperfect peer review, it
makes sense for scientists to produce lots of papers and “see what sticks”
rather than spend too much time perfecting a paper, and since any resulting
errors hurt society more than the scientist, the result follows.
I now briefly consider two objections. First, for all Theorem 2 says it
could be that p∗C = p∗V , the happy case in which individual incentives and
social optimality align exactly. However, this happens only if either the value
of erroneous results is so high that it is socially optimal to have no concern
for reproducibility (p∗C = p∗V = 0, not a particularly happy case) or the speed
function is not differentiable at the point of optimality. If these two situations
are ruled out the inequality is strict (p∗C < p∗V ).20
Second, one may object to the reproducibility p being a subjective prob-
ability. While the scientist may estimate credit subjectively, what matters
from the perspective of social value is the objective reproducibility of her
work. I reply that an important aspect of a scientist’s training is learning to
assess evidence objectively, so the scientist’s subjective reproducibility should
be close to the objective one.21 Insofar as they differ, the scientist is more
19This result is proven as Theorem 3.2 in Heesen, “Expediting Versus Rushing,” op. cit.,
appendix A.
20Heesen, “Expediting Versus Rushing,” op. cit., Theorem 3.3.
21For some evidence that scientists as a group are good at estimating reproducibility in
advance, see Camerer et al., “Replicability of Social Science Experiments,” op. cit.
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likely to be overconfident than underconfident. My result still holds if the
objective reproducibility is less than or equal to the subjective probability.22
What does this result mean for real scientists, who may care about other
things than maximizing credit, and who may be less than fully rational?
Insofar as credit acts as a selection mechanism in science, this means scientists
who rush into print are more likely to succeed than scientists who do not, so
one should expect rushing into print to increase over time.23 Thus there is a
structural misalignment of incentives, the effect of which is to push scientists
in the direction of rushing into print.
I think this misalignment is worth addressing, but one might object
that there could be countervailing motivations (goals of scientists other than
credit) or systematic irrationalities that make scientists choose socially op-
timal reproducibility levels despite my argument. It would be a surprising
coincidence if other motivations or irrationalities balanced out the incentive
to rush into print exactly, but I do not have an argument to rule this out. The
objection does illustrate the more general point that in evaluating potential
policy responses we should consider not just their effect on the issue at hand
(here, the credit incentive to rush into print) but also what the potential side
effects might be (here, effects on other motivations or irrationalities) and how
they can be managed. This is one reason why I stop short of recommending
any particular action in the next section.
iv. what can be done?
What can be done about this misalignment of incentives? One solution is to
eliminate imperfections in the peer review system. Without those imperfec-
tions credit incentives are perfectly aligned with the social optimum in my
model. But this is a lot to ask: it requires reviewers at scientific journals to
22Heesen, “Expediting Versus Rushing,” op. cit., Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2.
23See also Paul E. Smaldino and Richard McElreath, “The Natural Selection of Bad
Science,” Royal Society Open Science, iii, 9 (Sep. 21, 2016): 160384.
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be perfect predictors of whether a study will be successfully reproduced.
However, I noted that the misalignment of incentives in the model is
exclusively caused by false positives. So reducing those can bring the credit-
maximizing optimum closer to the social optimum. This seems to recommend
conservative editorial practices: rejecting papers even based on fairly minimal
doubts about their reproducibility. But if reducing false positives also leads
to more false negatives the effect will be that the maximum social value is
itself lowered, even if the credit-maximizing optimum is brought closer to it.
Investigating this further tradeoff is beyond the scope of this paper.
A different way to eliminate imperfections in the peer review system in-
volves getting rid of peer review altogether (possibly replacing it with post-
publication peer review). But even such a drastic rethinking of the way
scientific research is disseminated would not avoid this problem. The prob-
lem arises because scientific work needs to be evaluated in some way in the
short run (scientists need to decide what to read and what to cite, for exam-
ple). Hence the existence of peer review in its current form is not essential
to the incentive to rush into print.
Another solution focuses on the amount of credit given for irreproducible
results. If the credit given to irreproducible results matched the social value
of those results more closely, the gap between the credit-maximizing optimum
and the social optimum would be reduced. It would help if there were broader
general awareness of which research has been refuted, but this may be hard
to achieve. More specifically, one might aim to make hiring and promotion
committees more aware of candidates’ refuted results.
A third solution aims to compensate for the misalignment. For example,
Nelson, Simmons, and Simonsohn have suggested limiting the number of
papers scientists may publish per unit time.24 But the limit on the number
of papers would have to be just right to balance out the incentive to favor
24Leif D. Nelson, Joseph P. Simmons, and Uri Simonsohn, “Let’s Publish Fewer Papers,”
Psychological Inquiry, xxiii, 3 (2012): 291–93.
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speed over reproducibility without overshooting the optimum in the other
direction. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that different scientists
may have different speed functions, which may require different publication
limits to create the best incentive structure.
In this paper I have focused on rushing into print, without denying that
publication bias, data dredging, and other factors may also contribute to
reproducibility problems. But whereas the latter wear their corresponding
solutions on their sleeve (negative results should be publishable, scientists
should commit to pre-analysis plans), this discussion suggests that the solu-
tion to rushing into print is much less clear, if one exists at all. On this issue,
at least, it seems that the reward structure of science does not incentivize
socially beneficial choices.
remco heesen
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